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I. Introduction
In the many industrialised, developing and transition economies involved in privatisation
programmes, it is common to lament the lack of financial discipline and consequent lack of
efficiency of state-owned firms.  Several recent papers echo this widely expressed concern 
(Boardman and Vining ,1989; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Ott and Hartley, 1991; Shirely, 1995;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
The aim of this study is to investigate whether financial pressure has an effect on the
performance of  public firms1. The policy relevance of this study is illustrated by a recent paper
on how to improve the performance of public firms.  Muir and Saba (1995) emphasise the role of
debt among the external incentives that could put pressure on state-owned firms and push them
towards greater efficiency.  This paper draws on recent theoretical contributions and on new
empirical evidence to improve the understanding of that incentive, which is relevant not only for
state firms in transition and developing economies, but also for the debate on the privatisation of
public firms in industrialised countries.
The paper pulls together three different literatures not combined in this way before: the
theory of the existence of financial pressure for private firms; the empirical literature on the
effects of financial pressure for private firms; and the literature on the “soft budget constraint”,
which enables us to transpose these issues into the context of state-owned firms.
By definition, financial pressure arises in imperfect financial markets.  A well established
theoretical literature shows how asymmetry of  information, incompleteness of contracts,
principal-agent problems and financial distress require providers of funding to incur monitoring,
agency and transaction costs. These costs add a premium to the (unique) perfect markets cost
of capital. The premium on external finance creates a wedge between internal and external cost
of financing and, in some cases, leads to the rationing of credit (Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss,
1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984). These imperfections also determine
the specific terms of the funding contracts, simplified in this literature to just debt and equity.  For
example, bondholders require covenants (Smith and Warner, 1979) and new shareholders a
“lemon” premium (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  In brief, this literature has shown that external
finance is costly.
Further research has concentrated, instead, on the benefits that external finance can
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have for shareholders in a context of imperfect markets. These benefits occur in models in
which the standard assumption that managers act in the interest of shareholders is relaxed. In
this paper we focus on the beneficial effects of debt, more specifically non-marketable, “hard”,
senior, non-postponable debt.  If we assume that managers have objectives independent from
those of shareholders and bondholders, issuing debt has the benefit of constraining management,
creating financial discipline and leading to improved efficiency. Two features of debt contracts
bring about this effect.  The first is that debt contracts are not contingent on the performance of
the firm and therefore generate fixed repayment obligations.  This simple fact has the important
consequence, under the assumption that managers’ interests are not in line with shareholders’, of
limiting management discretion and providing external discipline.  The second is that, when
issued in excessive amounts, debt leads to financial distress and, eventually, to bankruptcy, which
is likely to reduce the perquisites of managers and even cause their dismissal.  The theory shows
that the threat of bankruptcy encourages managers to maximise profits and disciplines them into
behaving in the interest of shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Hart
and Moore, 1995; Jensen, 1986)2.
A related empirical literature has tested for the effects on investment of those financial
market imperfections which result in external funds being more expensive than internal funds
(see survey by Schiantarelli, 1996).  Seminal work by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) is
based on the idea that if firms were facing perfect capital markets, no relation should exist
between the availability of internal funds (i.e., cash flow) and investment.  Their results show,
instead, that for firms facing information problems in external capital markets investment is
(more) sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow. Therefore, for these firms, financial constraints
arising from the higher cost of external funding affect investment decisions and may lead to
underinvestment3.
More recent work, rooted in that literature but more directly linked to the theoretical
framework above, has taken a different direction and analysed the impact of financial constraints
and, more generally financial pressure, on other aspects of company behaviour, such as
inventory investment, R&D investment, employment, pricing and investment in market share
(see Hubbard, 1995 for a survey).  Nickell and Nicolitsas (1995), for example,  investigate the
effects of financial pressure, following an increase in the general level of interest rates, on
wages, productivity and employment.  Their results show that financial pressure has a large
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negative impact on employment, a small negative effect on wages and a small positive impact on
productivity of UK private firms.  A related strand of literature analyses the costs and benefits
of financial distress.  The idea is to investigate how highly leveraged firms respond to their own
poor economic performance or short term distress. Opler and Titman (1994) find that, for a
panel of US companies operating in economically distressed industries, financial distress has a
significant cost leading to output contraction and decline in the market value of equity.  However,
they do not regard their results as conclusive evidence on whether financial distress is costly or
beneficial.  Ofek (1993) finds that, for a panel also of US firms, higher pre-distress leverage
increases the probability of beneficial operational actions such as asset restructuring and
employees layoffs.  Wruck (1990) also investigates costs and benefits associated with financial
distress.  Her investigation concentrates on the effects on organisational efficiency. 
In summary, this body of empirical literature considers two effects of debt on firms. 
First, more “hard” debt results in a premium on the cost of capital, which in turn negatively
affects firms’ investment decisions (see, for example, Bond and Meghir, 1994 for the UK and
Rondi et al., 1994 for Italy).  Second, more debt leads to a higher ratio of debt to net worth and,
consequently, to higher probability of bankruptcy.  This, following the theoretical reasoning
above, has a beneficial disciplining effect on management who takes action to reduce “wasteful”
investment, to reduce employment and, in general, to increase productivity.
Our empirical study fits in this recent literature on the effects of financial pressure on
the performance of firms.  Its novelty consists in using the previously unrelated literature on the
“soft budget constraint” to transpose the analytical framework into the context of firms owned
by the government.  Our empirical investigation is carried out on a recently constructed panel of
Italian companies which includes both private and public firms.
The paper is divided into six sections.  Section I introduces the theoretical framework for
state-owned firms.  Section II describes the institutional context for Italian public firms and
emphasises the factors contributing to a change of budget constraint regimes.  Section III
discusses the empirical methodology.  Section IV describes the data and the descriptive
statistics.  Section V presents the empirical results.  Section VI concludes the paper.
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II. State-owned firms and soft budget constraint
We now turn to a discussion of the link between the financial discipline of public firms
and the theoretical and empirical frameworks for private firms.
The general view that public firms lack financial discipline compared to private firms can
be translated, in the context of these literatures, into four more precise claims4.  First, public
firms are not disciplined by the threat of  take-overs; second, they do not maximise profits; third,
they enjoy a more or less formal guarantee of government intervention in case of financial
distress; fourth, consequently, they are not subject to the threat of  bankruptcy.
The fact that public firms are not disciplined by the fear of take-overs is not as important
a difference as it may look at first sight.  Taking an international perspective, in most countries
private firms rarely experience take-overs (Franks and Mayer, 1990).  And even where they do,
there is mixed evidence on whether take-overs provide discipline (Boot,  1992; Franks and
Mayer, 1996; Grossman and Hart, 1980).  For these reasons we do not pursue this difference
any further.
The second claim, that public firms do not maximise profits, is more precisely stated by
saying that public firms are required to maximise a multiple-objective function (Laffont and
Tirole, 1993).  One objective is profits, but other objectives are employment and investment
targeted to support employment and growth, for example in particular regions.  Public firms in
most countries are required to take into account the effect of their decisions on employment5. 
This is an important point to which we will return in Section II.
We concentrate now on the other two claims.  The fourth claim, that public firms cannot
go bankrupt6, stems from the third, that public firms enjoy a more or less formal guarantee of
government intervention in case of financial distress.  Both claims follow from the inability of the
government to commit itself not to interfere in the economic affairs of a public firm.  And this is
so, in theory, because that intervention is the principal purpose of the existence a state-owned
firm in the first place (see Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987).  When this lack of commitment not to
intervene concerns the financial affairs of the firm, Jànos Kornai  defines it a soft budget
constraint regime, which he opposes to a “hard” budget constraint (Kornai, 1980).  “External
assistance is a random variable. The decision-maker has a subjective perception of the
probability distribution of this random variable.  The higher the subjective probability that excess
expenditure will be covered by external assistance, the softer the budget constraint” (Kornai,
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1990)7.  According to Kornai, this subjective probability is not meaningful for an individual firm
over time, it is rather a collective experience based on the regular experience of a number of
firms over time and on the expectation of similar experiences in the future.
Within this framework, the crucial factor that prevents debt from disciplining public firms
is the soft budget constraint regime in which they operate. If managers of public firms perceive
that the government will intervene when interest payments become too high, they will not be
pushed into taking action on the real variables of the firm.  Also, they will not fear losing their
jobs. Symmetrically, Kornai (1996) discusses how the more the budget constraint moves towards
a harder constraint, the more public firms are subject to financial discipline.
As the above quote suggests the softness of the constraint comes in various degrees and
can change over time. “The constraint need not assume one of only two different values: either
hard or soft.  There are also intermediate stages. ...  The degree of hardness of the budget
constraint is observable and measurable.  Since it is a very complex group of phenomena, it
cannot be described by a single cardinal indicator.  It can only be measured ordinally, by several
indicators together” (Kornai, 1990). In Section II we describe the budget constraint environment
in which Italian firms have operated in different periods.  We advance the hypothesis that this
“very complex group of phenomena” changed at the end of the 1980s.  This change will be at
the core of our empirical tests in Section V.
One last point we should address here is the required theoretical assumption of a conflict
of interests between managers and shareholders, which is plausible for many private firms.  In
the way public firms are described in some recent academic papers, this conflict does not seem
to arise.  Public managers are portrayed as bureaucrats with concentrated control rights, which
are exercised on the basis of a political agenda in the interest of groups that will make them win
the elections, for example trade unions of state employees (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1994). This reasoning suggests that managers of state-owned firms act exactly in
the interest of the state/shareholder and collude with its representatives, the politicians8.  Even if
this were always the case, this view disregards two facts:  that public managers often have
multiple principals checking on each other (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1996); and that, in any case,
politicians are agents themselves of the ultimate principals, the taxpayers.  In the corrupt context
above, bureaucrats and politicians interests are certainly in conflict with taxpayers’ interests.
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Having clarified the differences between private and public firms that are relevant for
our empirical study,  we turn to the analysis of the institutional environment in which Italian
public firms operate.
III. Institutional context
Rephrasing Kornai (1980),  the degree of hardness or softness of the budget constraint
is “a very complex group of phenomena”, which “cannot be described by a single cardinal
indicator”.  In Sections II.A and II.B we discuss those “several indicators” that allow us to
formulate a hypothesis regarding the budget regime in which Italian state-owned firms operate
during the period of our empirical analysis.
III.A. The “soft budget constraint” environment of Italian public firms
As in other European countries, public enterprises in Italy play a major role in the
economy accounting for around 15 percent of the non-agricultural labour force, 20 percent of
value added and 25 percent of fixed investments (1991 data).  The public sector controls around
70 percent of banking assets and has a major presence in many industries, services and, of
course, public utilities.
A distinctive Italian characteristic is that public ownership is organised through one-
hundred percent state-owned holding companies, with controlling interests in diversified sub-
holdings.  These, in turn, own individual enterprises, occasionally with minority private
shareholders (see Chart 1)9. The sub-holdings are mostly incorporated as private joint-stock
corporations, are governed by private commercial law, follow a private accounting system and
operate in a variety of competitive industries.  Our database is constructed from the balance
sheets of a sample of these individual firms (see Section IV).
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Chart 1.  Italian public sector ownership
Individual firm
(e.g. Alfa Romeo)
Automobile industry
Other individual firms
Manufacturing sub-holding
(e.g. FiNMECCANICA)
Private joint stock corporation
State majority shareholder
Individual firm
(e.g. Motta)
Food industry
Other individual firms
Manufacturing sub-holding
(e.g. SME)
Private joint stock corporation
State majority shareholder
Financial services sub-holdings
(e.g. Banca Commerciale Italiana)
Other individual firms
Other sub-holdings
Holding (e.g. IRI)
100% state owned
Direct public intervention in Italy started in the 1930s with a number of rescue
operations of distressed banks and of the manufacturing firms these banks owned (see De
Cecco and Giavazzi, 1993).  The mandate was to restructure these as parts of a newly created
holding company (IRI, Institute for Industrial Reconstruction) and then reinstate private
ownership.  After World War II, however, the original rescue plan was extended to promote
reconstruction.  Eventually, it was further extended into a full industrial policy plan of direct
intervention.  Two other holding companies were created, ENI (oil and gas sector) in 1953 and
EFIM (mechanical engineering and mining sectors) in 1962.  The objectives of the intervention
were:  counter-cyclical investment, direct management of basic industries, import substitution, the
promotion of industrialisation in less developed areas10, the restructuring of loss-making firms and
the protection of employment.  “The large number of objectives indicates that the state holdings
were recognised as a political instrument (...)” (Bianchi, 1990) and are an example of the
multiple objective function discussed in Section I.
Until the 1960s, the net operating performance of these firms was largely positive, which
suggests that profitability was also an important objective.  At that time the Italian system of
state intervention was also reported internationally as a successful model (Shonfield, 1977). 
During the 1970s, however, things changed.  The analyses by Nankani (1988) and Bianchi
(1990) attribute this to a variety of factors, among which the increased political pressure and
interference.  Following the first oil shock, for example, political and social pressure favoured the
acquisitions of further collapsing private companies by the holding companies (Bianchi, 1990). 
Also, political influence deeply affected strategic decisions, such as the location of new plants
and appointment of top management11.  Moreover, the effects of a number of ill-conceived laws
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became evident.  An example is the 1977 law (L. n. 675/77) which required state firms to
estimate the shadow costs12 they incurred by implementing “non-economic objectives”.  These
costs were then subsidised by the Treasury, a procedure which lent itself to abuse.
By the end of the 1970s, which is when our database starts, poor profitability (in some
cases huge losses), low productivity and high debt were the norm.  A 1979 Mediobanca survey
showed that the debt/equity ratio of public firms was around 13.2, compared with 3.5 for the
private sector (see Nankani, 1988 and data from our panel in Section IV), and all this, obviously,
without these firms ever being exposed to the risk of bankruptcy. 
In order for this situation to keep going, government funds were made available to the
state holdings, and redistributed to individual firms, through various sources (see Table I). 
Among these were endowment funds (fondi di dotazione), which were used to recapitalise
equity or for new investment. Losses were also financed with new debt. This debt was provided
by banks, mostly publicly-owned themselves. This brought allegations of excessively close
relationships between state-owned banks and state-owned firms.  There is no hard evidence of
misconduct in the allocation of credit by banks or special credit institutions in charge of medium
and long term subsidised credit13.  And, after all, private firms as well, in particular large private
firms, greatly benefited from  substantial subsidies and a close relationship with state banks.
Also, “there are cases of banks controlled by government entities, whose management has
traditionally enjoyed a high degree of autonomy” (Monti and Porta, 1990).  However, the same
authors discuss how “the Italian banking system has normally been characterised by a high
degree of accommodation towards the needs of the public sector”.  Also, there is some evidence
that the cost of capital was cheaper for public enterprises until 1988 (D'Auria and Foglia, 1997).
In summary, the environment in which Italian public firms operated in the 1970s up to
the mid-1980s was one characterised by political interference, accommodating endowment funds
and high debt provided by accommodating state-owned banks.  In our view this environment of
financial slack contains the main ingredients of what Jànos Kornai defines a soft budget
constraint regime in a mixed economy.
III.B. From “soft” to “hard” budget constraint
This situation, not dissimilar from that of other European countries in that period, was
financially unsustainable and there came a point when the government could no longer afford
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generous transfers to state firms.  The government budget deficit went from 3.7 percent of GDP
in 1970 to 11.3 percent in 1982 (OECD, 1989). In addition, public opinion was becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with the mismanagement of state funds by inefficient and loss-making
public enterprises (DiMajo, 1989).  With hindsight it is now possible to identify various factors
that triggered change and fostered a switch from a soft to a hard regime.  In this section we
highlight two:  the European factor and the privatisation factor.
In 1979, Italy joined the European Monetary System (EMS).  This, together with the
related process of integration of European economies and institutions in which Italy actively
participated, brought about a number of changes.  Participation in the EMS indirectly imposed
discipline on fiscal and monetary policy and also spurred restructuring in the manufacturing
industry.  Likewise, it created the environment in which the first steps were taken to give the
Bank of Italy greater independence.  For example, the Bank was no longer required to absorb
unsold government securities, issued independently of monetary base targets.  Instruments of
monetary policy  gradually returned to market-oriented instruments.  The First Banking Directive
(1977), implemented with delay14,  the financial liberalisation of banks’ capital movements (1988),
followed by the full liberalisation of capital movements (1990), posed new challenges to Italian
(state and private) banks.  As part of an enlarged market, at the end of the 1980s, Italian banks
felt the external market pressure from international competition and from the restructuring of the
entire European banking industry.  A reform of the banking system was carried out, important
deregulation measures were undertaken and, a few years later, provisions to prepare the
privatisation of banks were included in the Amato Law (1990).
Another aspect of the European factor was the tightening of competition policy by the
European Commission. Following the Single European Act of 1986 and in preparation for the
single internal market to start in 1993, this included a tighter discipline on state aid to firms.  In
particular, the European Commission advised the Italian government to reduce financial transfers
to state-owned firms.  For example, the re-capitalisation of the (mainly state-owned) steel
industry by the state over the period 1980-1985 was strongly criticised (CER/IRS, 1993).
In the same period, following a change in the international political climate, the
privatisation of nationalised industries became a common policy.  Several countries, following the
example of the UK, started privatisation programmes. In the mid-1980s, a modest privatisation
programme for small, restructured state companies was also started in Italy15. It is interesting to
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notice that the privatisation programme in Italy, in contrast for example to the UK experience, 
did not start as a consequence of major political change.  It was devised despite the reluctance
of the Italian government of the day.  Privatisation threats began to be perceived as realistic by
public firms mainly as a consequence of the unsustainability of the government deficit and of the
pressure from the internal market programme.
In 1987, restructuring plans for public firms began to include the closure of industrial
plants and lines of production and, in some cases, the dismissal of management.  An example is
the complete reorganisation of FINSIDER, an IRI sub-holding and sector holding itself of the
steel industry.  This trend culminated in 1991 with the liquidation of EFIM, the third largest state
holding.  It should be stressed that this was a revolutionary new experience for the Italian public
sector. And it could be viewed as the nearest public firms went to bankruptcy or take-over,
although these words were never mentioned in the political debate. 
In summary, the general attitude towards state firms began to change in the mid-1980s,
pushing the government to consider the potential benefits of  privatisation. This was
complemented, and somewhat enhanced, by the expectation of harsher EC scrutiny over
government subsidies and increased competitive pressure from European Union partners in both
manufacturing and banking industries.  The direct impact on state companies and their managers
was a sharp reduction in government financial transfers, a programme of corporate restructuring
and a realistic possibility of being privatised. Also, evidence in a recent paper by the Bank of
Italy on the determinants of bank loan interest rates between 1986 and 1994 suggests that credit
for public firms became more expensive than for private firms from 1991 (D'Auria and Foglia,
1997). It was cheaper until 1988 and insignificantly different between 1988 and 1990.
In conclusion, the environment in which Italian public firms were operating in the late
1980s was substantially different from before. In our view, this environment of increased
competition at a European level, changes in the banking system, European pressure for the
reduction of state aid, threats of privatisation, drying up of endowment funds, contributed to
creating more binding financial constraints and to a switch from a “soft” to a “hard” budget
constraint regime.
A good quantitative indicator of this evolution is the time series of endowment funds
(fondi di dotazione). Table I shows the figures for overall government assistance to state
holding companies. In spite of  new loans from the European Investment Bank and new
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government-guaranteed bonds issued by state holdings, the reduction in total assistance to the
public corporate sector was sharp.  The table clearly shows that the descending trend reached
the bottom in 198716.  This is the year we choose for the structural break in our empirical
estimations. 
IV. Empirical methodology
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether financial pressure has an effect on the
behaviour of  public firms. For this purpose the empirical approach developed for private firms
has to be adjusted in two important respects.
First, an appropriate assessment of the source of financial pressure on state-owned firm
has to centre around the issue of the budget constraint.  Financial pressure can be perceived as
such and be effective only if the budget constraint becomes “hard” following, for example, a
change in the macroeconomic and political environment.  As discussed above, the presence of a
soft budget constraint reduces the agency cost of debt due to the fact that the threat of
bankruptcy is zero for public firms. In other words, the disciplining effects of financial pressure
does not apply if managers perceive that their budget constraint is soft.
Second, an appropriate evaluation of the impact of financial pressure on a state-owned
firm should concentrate particularly on the effects on employment. As discussed in Section I,
there is a fundamental difference between the objective functions of private and state-owned
firms.  Whereas the function for the first has one maximand, profits, the function that public
firms are required to maximise has multiple variables.  And in many cases, profit is not the most
important one, employment is (Laffont and Tirole, 1993)17.
Once these adjustments are made, the aim of this paper becomes to test the hypothesis
that state firms, when operating in a “hard” budget constraint regime , do react to financial
pressure by pursuing restructuring strategies that improve efficiency.  In particular, we want to
test for the disciplinary benefits of leverage on public firms.  We test whether financial pressure
in a hard regime induces state firms to reduce organisational slack or restructure in a way  that
results in an increase in total factor productivity and/or in a reduction in employment.
Using a panel of Italian public and private firms, we estimate a productivity equation and
an employment equation to which, ad hoc, we add financial factors.  Results for private firms 
enable us to check whether responses to financial pressure differ across ownership structure.
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Assuming a standard constant returns Cobb-Douglas gross production function18, the
basic equation for total factor productivity , in log-linear form, is:
   yi,t = ai + at + l yi,t-1 +(1-l)b
L
i ni,t +(1-l)b
C
i ci,t +(1-l)(1-b
L
i-b
C
i)ki,t +
b1MSi,t-2 + (b2sizei +  b3imppenj. + b4 concj ) t + b5LEVi,t-2 +
b6AVLEVi. t + ei,t    (1)
where ai is the firm specific effect, at  is a time specific effect, yi,t is the log of real sales
(deflated by a three-digit industry-specific price index), ni,t is the log of employment19, ci,t is the
log of (real) materials, ki,t is the log of (real) capital stock,, i is the firm subscript, t is the time
subscript and j is the industry subscript.  eit is a zero mean stochastic shock to the production
function, under the assumption of no serial correlation.  The lagged dependent variable is
included to capture adjustment lags, since additional production factors usually take time to
become fully productive.
In order to account for the impact of competition on productivity growth, we add the
firm’s time-variant market share (MSi), and the firm’s average size (sizei), industry average
import penetration (imppenj. ) and point industry concentration (concj), all time-invariant20. 
Since for estimation purposes we take variables in first differences to eliminate the firm-specific
effects, the inclusion of the time-variant market share captures the effect of changes in
competition (more precisely, the firm’s market power) on changes in productivity (i.e.,
productivity growth).  In contrast, the remaining time-invariant variables represent cross-section
correlations between the level (toughness) of competition and productivity growth21.
To ensure that we capture as comprehensively as possible the effects of financial
pressure, we include two financial variables in equation (1).  The first, LEV, is the ratio of total
debt to assets (fixed capital and gross working capital).  A number of important observations
need to be made on this measure. First, LEV is lagged two periods and this is for two reasons: 
the effect of a change in financial pressure does take time to translate into productivity growth
and, also, any shock to productivity is likely to have an impact on the firm’s financial policy and
may generate reverse causality problems.  Analogously, market share is lagged two periods to
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 11/1997
15
reduce reverse causality problems.  Second, as in the case of market share, the relationship
between the level of the debt ratio (LEV) and the level of productivity becomes, in first
differences, the relationship between a change in the debt ratio and a change in productivity.
Therefore, we investigate the impact of a change in leverage on a change in productivity. 
Third, our choice of a stock variable to measure financial pressure for public firms, as opposed to
a financial flow measure as used in other empirical works in this area, is  due to the fact that
these are likely to receive substantial subsidised loans. Indeed, a flow measure, for example
interests over cash flow as used by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1995), misrepresents the financial
pressure public firms are subject to. Subsidised interest payments do not  capture the full
pressure of the expected repayment of the full principal at maturity22.  Fourth, besides long,
medium and short term financial debt, in the numerator of LEV, we also include trade debt.  This
is because trade debt is a substantial component of debt for Italian (and other continental) firms.
Marotta (1992) reports that, in 1983, trade debt for Italian firms accounted for twenty-two
percent of their sales, in contrast to a seven percent figure for US firms.  As it is also the norm
for Italian firms, financial debt in LEV is non-marketable debt23 and includes intra-group debt.
The second variable for financial pressure in equation (1), AVLEV, is a three-year
moving average of the debt ratio LEV, centered at t-3.  In equation (1) AVLEV  is
multiplied by t as an expositional device to show that it enters in levels in the
estimated regression in first differences.  The rationale for this is that we want to
investigate whether firms with higher leverage, i.e. with a high stock  of debt, are likely to have a
greater improvement in productivity.  The theory suggests that this could happen for two
reasons.  First, higher leverage is likely to increase contract enforcement costs and incentive
problems, thus raising the premium on the cost of capital and, in turn, increasing the pressure to
reduce slackness.  Second, highly leveraged companies are more likely to be closer to financial
distress and to be more motivated to restructure.  In theory, they should achieve the largest
improvement in efficiency (see Jensen, 1989).
The equation for the demand for labour is again derived from a Cobb-Douglas
production function.  In log-linear form, the equation is:
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     ni,t  = g1 wi,t + g2 ni,t-1 + g3 ni,t-2 + g4 ki,t + g5 MSi,t + g6 yj,t + g7 yj,t-1 + g8
LEVi,t-2+ g9 AVLEVi.  t +  ai + at  +  ei,t                        (2)
where ni,t  is the log of employment and wi,t  is the log of real wages (total labour cost divided by
the number of employees).   To account for imperfect (Cournot) competition we add the firm’s
market share (MSi,t) and industry demand factors ( yj,t, the log of the three-digit industry
output).  To account for adjustment costs, we include lagged employment. We assume static
expectations24.  Again we include both LEV  and AVLEV as measures of financial pressure. 
With LEV we capture the impact of a change in the debt ratio on a change in employment.  With
AVLEV we capture the effect of the stock of the debt ratio on changes in employment in order
to investigate  whether highly-leveraged firms reduce their workforce more than less-leveraged
firms.
Finally, in both productivity and employment equations, we introduce a structural break
to check whether our financial variables (LEV and AVLEV)  have a different impact during the
“soft” budget constraint period (1977-87) and the “hard” budget constraint years (1987-1993). 
We interact our financial variables in all estimating equations with two time dummies which
locate the structural break in 1987.
V. Data and descriptive statistics
The database we use for estimation purposes is an unbalanced panel constructed by
researchers at CERIS using the balance sheet data collected by Mediobanca investment bank25.
 The panel includes 1318 manufacturing companies, 150 state-owned and 1168 privately owned,
over the period 1977-1993, for a total of 1300 and 9927 firm-year observation, respectively.  It
includes only firms with at least five consecutive observations, so that each firm has a time
series of at least five and at most seventeen years.  Table A1 reports the number of firm-year
observations by type of ownership.  Firms are classified according to their ownership, which can
change over time in either direction, from state-owned to private or viceversa.  Moreover, each
firm is allocated to its primary industry defined according to the three-digit NACE-CLIO
classification.  Finally, whenever a major operation occurs such as mergers, acquisitions, or
divestures, by construction the panel drops the observation for that year and breaks up the time
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series because that observation is unlikely to be comparable with the previous and following one.
 It is therefore reasonable to assume that changes in output, employment and fixed capital are
not artificially affected by these factors. 
This data base does not contain other information that in principle would be interesting to
have, such as dividend payout data, firms’ market value and marketable debt and bond issues. 
However, relatively few Italian firms are quoted on the stock exchange and the Italian corporate
bond market is very small.  More importantly for the focus of this paper, it also does not contain
disaggregated information on intra-group debt, trade credit, or subsidised loans.
Tables II and III report yearly data for the main variables used in the econometric
analysis.  Table IV reports the average values for the entire period of other relevant
economic and financial variables. For these variables, Tables IV also reports the averages for
the  two sub-periods, the soft budget constraint years (1977-87) and the hard budget
constraint years (1988-93).
The first impression one gets from looking at the averages over the entire
period is that differences between state firms and private firms are not as great as
one might have assumed a priori.  The average employment growth rate, although
not significant,  is exactly the same, -0.015 for both groups of firms (last line in
Table II).  The average investment ratio over the entire period is 0.119 for state
firms and 0.113 for private firms.  The average leverage is 0.565 for public firms
and 0.453 for private firms (see Table III). However, differences do emerge when
we split the period into soft budget and hard budget constraint periods.
The first important difference is exactly in the values of the leverage ratio
(LEV). The average for public firms drops by five percentage points in the second
period while the one for private firms remains unchanged (see Tables IV).  The year
by year dynamic is illustrated in Table III, which shows the steady reduction of the
leverage ratio of public firms (temporarily reversed only in 1987 and between
1989 and 1991), in contrast to the fairly constant indebtedness of private firms. 
The largest point difference with private firms is in 1977 when the leverage ratio
was 0.771 for public firms and 0.497 for private firms, more than fifty percent
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higher. Another important difference is in the values of labour productivity.  Table
II illustrates the remarkable catching up of public firms’ labour productivity. 
Starting from an eight percentage point difference in 1977, the steady improvement
culminates in a spurt which brings public firms’ labour productivity, in 1993, to a
level (2.45) higher than that of private firms (2.16).  Another difference is in the
pattern of the investment ratio, reported for completeness in  Table II.  It shows the
counter-cyclical pattern of investment of public firms during the 1981-83
recession, during the soft budget constraint years.  It also shows that this pattern
was not as strong during the 1991-92 recession.
Table IV reports average statistics for cash flows and gross margins, split
into the two sub-periods.  These show the clear improvement in public firms
profitability between the soft budget constraint years and the “hard” ones.  Average
cash flows over sales were negative in the first period and turned positive (although
small) in the second.   Gross margins over sales  improved by one percentage point.
 The pattern for private firms, instead, remains similar across the two periods.
We also report data on the components of the debt included in our leverage
ratio.  These confirm what discussed in Section III on the relevance of trade debt
for Italian firms.  In our sample trade debt makes up for roughly half of the debt of
both private and public firms.  Also noticeable is its increase for public firms
during the hard budget constraint years.  We also report statistics for the maturity
of debt (MAT), which decreases for public firms and increases for private firms in
the second period.
VI. Estimation and empirical results
In this section we present the results of the estimation of the productivity and
employment equations for a panel of Italian state-owned and private companies.  In Tables V
and VI we report the results for the entire period and for a specification which accounts for the
inclusion of the structural break.
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To carry out the estimation, we use the DPD programme by Arellano and Bond (1988,
1991), which is designed for dynamic panel data.  To eliminate the time-invariant firm specific
effects, all equations are estimated in first differences. To control for endogeneity of the
regressors, we use the Generalised Methods of Moments technique, with variables lagged at
least two periods as instruments.  The use of instrumental variables is necessary because
employment (ni,t ) and capital (k i,t) are likely to be correlated with the error term
26. Lagging two
periods is necessary because, after first-differencing, the lagged dependent variable is correlated
with the error term, so that instruments lagged one period are invalid.  To check for absence of
serial correlation in the residuals, we use the M1 and M2 tests for first- and second-order serial
correlation developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and report them for all equations.  However,
if the error term in the level equation is serially uncorrelated, after first-differencing, first-order,
but not second-order, serial correlation is to be expected. If we find second order correlation we
use instruments dated t-3 or earlier. The Sargan test of correlation between the instruments and
the error term is also reported (cf. Sargan, 1958, and Hansen, 1982).  To distinguish the time
pattern of state and private firms, in all equations we include ownership-specific time dummies. 
Finally, to account for the fact that a poor (good) performance may affect the government
decision to rescue (privatise) the firm, the dummy variable that distinguishes private and public
firms is instrumented.
VI.A. Productivity regression and results
As mentioned above, to eliminate the firm-specific characteristics ai , we take first
differences of equation (1) and we rearrange to obtain:
D (yi,t - ki,t )=l D (yi,t-1 - ki,t )+ (1-l)b
L
i D (ni,t - ki,t )+ (1-l)b
M
i D (ci,t -
ki,t )+ b1DMSi,t-2 +b2sizei. + b3imppenj. + b4concj + b5DLEVi,t-2
+ b6AVLEVi. + Dat + D ei,t (3)
In Table V, column (1), we report the estimated coefficients for the entire period27.  In
column (2), we introduce the structural break and allow financial variables to have a different
impact on productivity depending on the budget constraint regime.  In the estimation we add 2-
digit industry dummies as regressors and as instruments to deal with the lack of appropriate
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instruments for the time-invariant competition variables (sizei., imppenj. and concj) and to
account for the influence of industry specific technological factors on productivity growth.
Given the purpose of the paper, we turn first to the results for the variables that measure
financial pressure, the coefficients on LEV and AVLEV28.  For state-owned firms, in column (1),
we find that the coefficient on LEV is negative and significant.  In other words, when we
consider the entire period, we find that financial pressure for state firms does not translate in
higher productivity.
In contrast, the results for private firms for the entire period show a positive and
significant coefficient on LEV.   In line with theoretical predictions, this implies that Italian private
firms are disciplined by an increase in leverage which, in turn, leads to an improvement in
productivity.  This behaviour is consistent with that of the UK private firms studied by Nickell
and Nicolitsas (1995)29. Moreover, the coefficient on AVLEV is also positive and significant.  Not
only an increase in financial pressure positively affects productivity growth for private firms, but
also the more highly leveraged firms appear to be more motivated to take actions to improve
efficiency.
In column (2) we introduce the structural break.  We run the same regression interacting
LEV with two dummy variables accounting for a change in the budget constraint.  LEV*S
investigates the effect of financial factors during the “soft” regime (1977-1987) and LEV*H
during the “hard” regime (post 1988)30.  We apply the same procedure to AVLEV.
The results for private firms for the subperiods are virtually unchanged from those of
column (1). The coefficients remain positive and significant in both periods, with the exception of
the coefficient on AVLEV*S.  After all, private firms should always be under a “hard” budget
constraint!  It is interesting to notice that the coefficient on LEV*H is lower than the one on
LEV*S.  Although our hypothesis of a structural break in 1987 does not apply to private firms,
one could argue that in a hard budget constraint regime private firms are less likely to be
“rescued” from bankruptcy by state-owned holding companies and therefore one could expect a
stronger impact of financial pressure in that period (see also note 5).  However, this effect does
not show in our results.
In contrast, the empirical findings  for public firms clearly show the effect of a change
of budget regime. The estimated coefficient for LEV*S is negative and significant, whereas the
coefficient on LEV*H is positive and significant. Financial pressure becomes beneficial when
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the budget constraint hardens after 1987.  Additional evidence of the strong effect of the change
of regime is that the coefficient on LEV*H for state firms is large (0.134 in column (2)) and is
more than six times greater than the one for private firms (0.022).
Allowing for the structural break brings the estimated coefficients on AVLEV for state
firms to acceptable levels of significance in the second period.  However, contrary to the
theoretical predictions, the signs of the coefficients are negative. Our interpretation of this result
hinges on what we call the “lost cause” argument. By this we mean that the most highly
leveraged firms are so heavily compromised that they cannot recover efficiency. There are a
number of “lost cause” firms in the Italian public sector.  For example, in our sample several
state firms are part of EFIM, one of the state holding companies, which went bankrupt in 1991. 
In our sample, the most highly leveraged firms have a debt ratio three times larger than the least
indebted firms.  Companies in the top decile average a debt to asset ratio of 0.87 against 0.26 for
companies in the first decile. In a Modigliani and Miller-cum-financial distress framework, these
companies have a debt/equity ratio so beyond the optimal level (see Wruck, 1990) that they are
unable to recover.
We conclude with some brief comments on the coefficients of the variables capturing
the effect of competition on productivity growth.  In both columns, the market share (MS) and
concentration (conc) coefficients are the only ones that are statistically significant and, in
addition, they have the same sign for private and public firms.  The coefficients for the lagged
market share are negative, suggesting that an increase in market power, reducing competitive
pressure, depresses productivity.  This is in line with the commonly held view that competition
improves company performance and is also in line with the results obtained by Nickell (1996) for
UK firms.  In contrast, the estimated coefficients on point concentration are positive, which,
counterintuitively, indicate that firms in more concentrated industries have higher total factor
productivity growth.  This may seem inconsistent with the market share result.  However,
whereas the coefficients on market share capture a time series effect, the concentration
coefficients only capture the cross-section effect and therefore they might reflect a reverse
causality effect.  This may also arise due to the lack of appropriate instruments.  For a particular
firm, causality may run such that the higher the productivity growth, the stronger the company’s
market position and, eventually, the higher the industry concentration of the sector, which, in turn,
translates in a positive relationship between concentration and productivity growth.
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VI.B. Employment results
In Tables VI we report the empirical results for the employment equation (2). We want
to check whether, in their effort to recover efficiency, state companies had to resort to reducing
the labour force in response to increased financial pressure.   If this is the case, it implies that the
pressure was so great that they had to abandon one of their main institutional goals.  Indeed, as
discussed in sections II and III, employment is one of the most important variables in the
objective function of state firms.
We start again with the results for the entire period, reported in column (1).  The
estimated coefficient on lagged LEV for state-owned is negative and significant.  This clearly
indicates that, in response to an increase in total debt to asset ratio over time, state companies
reduced employment, a result already consistent for the entire period with what the theory
predicts.  An increase in debt has the effect of pushing the firm towards efficiency measures
such as reducing employment.  The coefficient for AVLEV is also negative and not far from
significance. This suggests that the higher the stock of debt the more firms tend to reduce their
labour demand.
However, when we introduce the structural break in column (2), the empirical findings
clearly show that the switch of regimes has, once more, a strong impact on public firms.  Once
we relax the restriction of the coefficients on the financial factors to be equal across the full
sample period, we find that state firms’ propensity to reduce employment in response to
increasing financial pressure is  three times stronger under a “hard” regime.  The coefficient on
LEV*H  is -0.131 and the one on LEV*S  is -0.039.  This result indicates that from the late
1980s a harsher external environment led public firms to respond to the financial pressure of high
debt and to undertake restructuring and efficiency seeking strategies.
The coefficient for AVLEV*S - negative and significant - is consistent with LEV*S. 
However, the coefficient for AVLEV*H  is positive.  Again, we explain this result with the “lost
cause” argument.  As discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that firms with extreme
leverage ratios, as those, for example, in the top decile of our sample, are unable to improve
efficiency under any condition.
The results for private firms for the entire period show a negative coefficient on LEV,
which is consistent with Nickell and Nicolitsas (1995)’s results for UK private firms, although
small and not significant.  The coefficient for AVLEV is very small, positive and not significant. 
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The coefficients in Table VIIb for the two periods are more informative. Both coefficients on
LEV are still negative, and this time the one for the first period is substantial and significant.  This
suggests that the reaction of private firms to financial pressure is much stronger in the period
1977-87.  A possible explanation for this result has to do with the liberalization of the banking
system in the late 1980s.  A study by the Banca Commerciale Italiana (Tendenze Monetarie,
February 1994) shows that changing from a restrictive regime to one of liberalized competition
led to an adjustment process by trial and error in which banks overlent.  This may have softened
the financial pressure for private firms.  We also find that, in contrast to the results for state
firms, the coefficients on  AVLEV are very small, showing a negligible impact of the stock of
debt on employment growth.
VII. Conclusions
This paper extends the literature on financial pressure to the case of state-owned firms
and then carries out an empirical investigation using a panel of private and public Italian firms. 
In developing our hypotheses, we draw from three literatures not combined in this way before. 
The theoretical literature on financial pressure shows that debt can have a beneficial disciplining
effect on the performance of private firms.  The related empirical literature finds some evidence
of this effect for private firms.  In the context of public firms, Kornai (1990) has highlighted the
importance of distinguishing between “soft” and “hard” budget constraint regimes.
We hypothesise that financial pressure applies to state-owned firms only in a “hard”
budget constraint regime.  Therefore, we test for the effect of financial pressure during a period
of soft budget constraint and a period of hard budget constraint.  Our empirical approach
consists in the estimation of two equations, one for total factor productivity and one for
employment, to investigate whether financial pressure leads state-owned firms to enhance
efficiency and to reduce employment. In particular, we check whether both a change in the
leverage of these firms and the level of their stock of debt have an impact on productivity
growth and employment growth.  We use an unbalanced panel of 1318 Italian firms, 150 state-
owned and 1168 privately owned, over the period 1977-1993.  An examination of the institutional
context in which Italian public firms operate provides support for the hypothesis that our sample
period can be split into a “soft” budget constraint period 1977-1987 and a “hard” budget
constraint period 1988-1993.
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 11/1997
24
Our results reveal a sharp contrast in the response of Italian public firms to the pressure
of debt between the two periods.  We find that the responses of public firms to increased debt
are consistent with financial pressure only during the period of hard budget constraint, when their
behaviour is similar to that of private firms.  In that environment, public firms do respond to
financial pressure by increasing total factor productivity and reducing employment.
This paper also has implications for policy.  The empirical findings provide support for
the view described in Muir and Saba (1995) that external debt can create an incentive for state-
owned firms to improve efficiency.  The findings are relevant not only for state firms in transition
and developing economies, but also for public firms in industrialised economies engaged in (or
considering) privatisation programmes.
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Table I
Italy - Government Assistance to State Holding Companies (US$ million)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Endowment funds 
(excluding GEPI)1,2 2,910 1,857 932 123 147 122
Capital & Interest 
Repayment on EIB Loans 30 48 76 117 214 214
New EIB Loans 405 116 976 714 7833 572
Bond Issues - 917 1,174 386 115 -
Total Assistance 3,315 3,140 2,615 902 861 709
1 In addition, each entity receives payments for the purchase of GEPI (Gestioni e Partecipazioni Industriali) stock which
are additions to the endowment funds. The total allocations per entity authorized from 1971 to 1990 were US$540
million each. Not all of this has been paid; annual allocations for 1988 to 1990 per entity are US$30 million or US$90
million each for each year (1990 exchange rates).
2These totals may not add up because of small sums allocated to other small state holding agencies.
3US$350 million with service on principal and interest entirely charged to the State, plus US$500 million.
Source: Ministry of State Holdings: Bilancio consolidato , various years, in Kumar (1993).
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Table II
Descriptive statistics - Labour productivity, employment growth and investment rate
State-owned Private
LABPROD DN IK LABPROD DN IK
Year Mean (Std.Dev.) Mean (Std.Dev.) Mean (Std.Dev.) Mean (Std.Dev.) Mean (Std.Dev.) Mean (Std.Dev.)
1977 0.797 (0.992) - - - - 0.877 (0.899) - - - -
1978 0.833 (1.007) 0.010 (0.082) 0.159 (0.159) 0.953 (1.132) -0.004 (0.797) 0.176 (0.430)
1979 0.804 (0.926) 0.012 (0.094) 0.124 (0.225) 0.996 (1.140) 0.006 (0.102) 0.169 (0.248)
1980 0.817 (0.924) 0.012 (0.097) 0.154 (0.138) 1.101 (1.265) -0.011 (0.118) 0.152 (0.160)
1981 0.935 (1.365) -0.017 (0.092) 0.166 (0.134) 1.119 (1.255) -0.030 (0.143) 0.133 (0.125)
1982 0.857 (0.899) -0.027 (0.052) 0.125 (0.119) 1.138 (1.195) -0.037 (0.099) 0.094 (0.226)
1983 0.995 (1.071) -0.040 (0.097) 0.127 (0.113) 1.232 (1.557) -0.042 (0.135) 0.096 (0.131)
1984 0.912 (0.792) -0.040 (0.105) 0.096 (0.090) 1.384 (1.763) 0.032 (0.156) 0.100 (0.091)
1985 0.916 (0.687) -0.035 (0.084) 0.079 (0.139) 1.489 (2.113) -0.021 (0.096) 0.107 (0.085)
1986 1.051 (1.273) -0.053 (0.265) 0.111 (0.106) 1.749 (5.536) 0.012 (0.101) 0.102 (0.104)
1987 1.172 (1.374) 0.007 (0.287) 0.110 (0.119) 1.799 (4.697) 0.008 (0.106) 0.114 (0.091)
1988 1.389 (1.840) 0.002 (0.149) 0.103 (0.082) 1.794 (2.198) 0.007 (0.098) 0.112 (0.084)
1989 1.710 (2.610) -0.009 (0.070) 0.108 (0.062) 1.947 (2.858) -0.001 (0.136) 0.110 (0.090)
1990 1.694 (2.662) 0.024 (0.218) 0.126 (0.091) 1.930 (2.778) 0.004 (0.137) 0.120 (0.127)
1991 1.907 (2.984) 0.003 (0.105) 0.123 (0.117) 2.002 (3.142) -0.021 (0.105) 0.136 (0.075)
1992 2.139 (3.769) -0.075 (0.117) 0.078 (0.058) 2.101 (3.264) 0.040 (0.139) 0.079 (0.075)
1993 2.450 (4.944) -0.010 (0.150) 0.074 (0.061) 2.160 (4.085) -0.028 (0.135) 0.072 (0.073)
Average 1.167 (1.874) -0.015 (0.145) 0.119 (0.126) 1.618 (3.001) -0.015 (0.122) 0.113 (0.142)
Legend:
LABPROD =real sales / number of employees
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DN      = rate of growth of employment
IK        = investment / fixed capital
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Table III
Descriptive statistics  -Leverage ratio (LEV) for state-owned and private firms
State-owned Private
Year Cases Mean Std. Dev. Year Cases Mean Std. Dev.
1977 76 0.771 (0.479) 1977 288 0.497 (0.234)
1978 76 0.734 (0.379) 1978 291 0.489 (0.224)
1979 81 0.711 (0.266) 1979 340 0.502 (0.210)
1980 90 0.703 (0.264) 1980 414 0.481 (0.201)
1981 93 0.568 (0.222) 1981 470 0.460 (0.186)
1982 90 0.539 (0.210) 1982 528 0.436 (0.175)
1983 88 0.515 (0.185) 1983 570 0.447 (0.187)
1984 86 0.502 (0.189) 1984 586 0.455 (0.191)
1985 87 0.478 (0.186) 1985 662 0.440 (0.198)
1986 84 0.430 (0.170) 1986 736 0.426 (0.202)
1987 79 0.453 (0.200) 1987 752 0.434 (0.261)
1988 78 0.441 (0.185) 1988 800 0.445 (0.252)
1989 85 0.566 (0.226) 1989 840 0.473 (0.254)
1990 70 0.565 (0.232) 1990 776 0.454 (0.235)
1991 53 0.567 (0.238) 1991 688 0.442 (0.252)
1992 49 0.552 (0.245) 1992 639 0.443 (0.266)
1993 35 0.492 (0.252) 1993 547 0.453 (0.311)
Average 1300 0.565 (0.271) Average 9927 0.453 (0.232)
Legend:
LEV = (MLTFD + STFD + TRAD) / (FC + GWC)
where:
MLTFD = medium and long term financial debt
STFD = short term financial debt
TRAD = trade debt
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FC   = fixed capital
GWC = gross working capital (liquidity excluded)
Table IV
Descriptive statistics - Other characteristics of state-owned and private firms
Period 1977-1993 Period 1977-1987 Period 1988-1993
State-owned Private State-owned Private State-owned Private
Mean  (Std. Dev.) Mean  (Std.
Dev.)
Mean  (Std.
Dev.)
Mean  (Std.
Dev.)
Mean  (Std.
Dev.)
Mean  (Std.
Dev.)
LEV 0.565 (0.271) 0.453 (0.232) 0.579 (0.285) 0.453 (0.209) 0.531 (0.230) 0.453 (0.260)
MLONGD 0.252 (0.206) 0.213 (0.176) 0.277 (0.209) 0.211 (0.172) 0.189 (0.181) 0.217 (0.182)
SHORTD 0.307 (0.226) 0.260 (0.203) 0.322 (0.222) 0.263 (0.192) 0.271 (0.229) 0.256 (0.218)
TRADED 0.441 (0.228) 0.527 (0.202) 0.401 (0.215) 0.527 (0.214) 0.540 (0.233) 0.527 (0.232)
MAT 0.469 (0.324) 0.459 (0.327) 0.474 (0.311) 0.445 (0.312) 0.458 (0.356) 0.478 (0.345)
LY 6.537 (1.025) 6.200 (0.867) 6.542 (1.069) 6.193 (0.897) 6.524 (0.909) 6.209 (0.827)
LN 6.768 (1.010) 6.077 (0.985) 6.930 (1.079) 6.245 (1.023) 6.362 (1.043) 5.857 (0.885)
CFS -0.029
(0.168)
0.044 (0.077) -0.042
(0.177)
0.045 (0.078) 0.003 (0.138) 0.043 (0.076)
MARG/S 0.069 (0.125) 0.105 (0.084) 0.066 (0.127) 0.110 (0.085) 0.077 (0.118) 0.099 (0.082)
Legend:
LEV = (LTFD + STFD + TRAD) / (FC + GWC)
MLONGD = LTFD/(LTFD + STFD + TRAD)
SHORTD = STFD/(LTFD + STFD + TRAD)
TRADED = TRAD/(LTFD + STFD + TRAD)
MAT = LTFD/(LTFD + STFD)
LY  = Log of real sales
LN  = Log of employment
CFS = cash flow / sales
MARG /S = gross margin /sales
where:
cash flows  = value added - labour cost - interests - taxes
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gross margin = value added - labour cost
MLTFD  = medium and long term financial debt
STFD  = short term financial debt
TRAD = trade debt
FC      =  fixed capital
GWC  = gross working capital (liquidity excluded)
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Table V
Estimates- Productivity equation (period 1981-1993)
Dependent Variable: D (yi,t - kit)
S ("soft" budget constraint): 1977-1987 H ("hard" budget constraint): 1988-1993
(1) (2)
State-owned firms State-owned firms
D (yit-1 - kit) 0.246 (0.025) 0.230 (0.026)
D (nit - kit) 0.060 (0.028) 0.085 (0.031)
D (cit - kit) 0.693 (0.017) 0.679 (0.018)
imp penj. 0.002 (0.013) 0.016 (0.017)
concj 0.042 (0.013) 0.048 (0.015)
size i. -0.008 (0.007) -0.011 (0.007)
DMSit-2 -0.511 (0.100) -0.461 (0.097)
DLEVit-2 -0.025 (0.012) - -
DLEVit-2 × S - - -0.047 (0.013)
DLEVit-2 × H - - 0.134 (0.040)
AVLEVi. -0.005 (0.010) - -
AVLEVi. × S - - -0.001 (0.011)
AVLEVi. × H - - -0.104 (0.031)
Private firms Private firms
D (yit-1- kit) 0.063 (0.015) 0.048 (0.015)
D (nit - kit) 0.184 (0.016) 0.204 (0.016)
D (cit - kit) 0.766 (0.013) 0.759 (0.014)
imp penj. -0.004 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007)
concj 0.027 (0.008) 0.033 (0.008)
size i. -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
DMSit-2 -0.241 (0.073) -0.262 (0.075)
DLEVit-2 0.023 (0.007) - -
DLEVit-2 × S - - 0.042 (0.009)
DLEVit-2 × H - - 0.022 (0.007)
AVLEVi. 0.004 (0.002) - -
AVLEVi. × S - - 0.002 (0.003)
AVLEVi. × H - - 0.013 (0.003)
W 8300.3 [18] 8261.0 [22]
M1 -5.690 [1042] -5.348 [1042]
M2 -1.711 [  842] -1.104 [ 842]
Sargan 271.173 [  252] 257.367 [ 248]
Instruments: (y i,t-1 - kit) (t-2,...), (n it - kit) (t-2,...), yit (t-2,...), AVLEV (t-2,...), PUB (t-2), ownership
specific time dummies, 2-digit industry dummies. 2-digit industry dummies also included as
regressors.
Legend:
Standard errors in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series and cross-
section heteroskedasticity.
W = Wald test of joint significance of the regressors (c² distribution).
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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Table VI
Estimates - Employment equation (period 1981-1993)
Dependent Variable: Dnit
S ("soft" budget constraint): 1977-1987        H ("hard" budget constraint): 1988-1993
(1) (2)
State-owned firms State-owned firms
Dwit -0.508 (0.034) -0.498 (0.036)
Dnit-1 0.579 (0.029) 0.537 (0.033)
Dnit-2 0.131 (0.009) 0.136 (0.009)
Dkit -0.073 (0.024) -0.074 (0.026)
DMSit -0.034 (0.057) -0.166 (0.081)
DYINDj t 0.207 (0.034) 0.197 (0.035)
DYINDjt-1 0.051 (0.034) 0.108 (0.039)
DLEVit-2 -0.029 (0.006) - -
DLEVit-2 · S - - -0.039 (0.008)
DLEVit-2 · H - - -0.131 (0.020)
AVLEVi. -0.007 (0.004) - -
AVLEVi. · S - - -0.020 (0.006)
AVLEVi. · H - - 0.028 (0.015)
Private firms Private firms
Dwit -0.465 (0.020) -0.445 (0.021)
Dnit-1 0.578 (0.018) 0.578 (0.019)
Dnit-2 0.121 (0.008) 0.121 (0.008)
Dkit 0.024 (0.007) 0.018 (0.007)
DMSit 0.249 (0.012) 0.256 (0.013)
DYINDj t 0.136 (0.023) 0.136 (0.025)
DYINDjt-1 0.020 (0.019) 0.022 (0.020)
DLEVit-2 -0.005 (0.005) - -
DLEVit-2 · S - - -0.027 (0.007)
DLEVit-2 · H - - -0.005 (0.006)
AVLEVi. 0.001 (0.002) - -
AVLEVi. · S - - 0.006 (0.003)
AVLEVi. · H - - -0.007 (0.002)
W 355.7  [   18] 383.6   [   22]
M1 -3.251 [1042] -3.311 [1042]
M2 -0.582 [  842] -0.685 [  842]
Sargan 353.818 [  344] 344.245 [  340]
Instruments: wit (t-3, ...), n it (t-3, ...), kit (t-3, ...), MSit (t-3, ...), AVLEV (t-3, ...), PUB (t-3), YIND
(t-3), ownership specific time dummies.
Legend:
Standard errors in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series and cross-
section heteroskedasticity.
W = Wald test of joint significance of the regressors (c² distribution).
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (c² distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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Table A.1
Unbalanced panel of Italian firms. Number of observations by type of ownership
Year State-owned Private Total
1977 76 288 364
1978 76 291 367
1979 81 340 421
1980 90 414 504
1981 93 470 563
1982 90 528 618
1983 88 570 658
1984 86 586 672
1985 87 662 749
1986 84 736 820
1987 79 752 831
1988 78 800 878
1989 85 840 925
1990 70 776 846
1991 53 688 741
1992 49 639 688
1993 35 547 582
Total 1300 9927 11227
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NOTES
                                                
1 In the paper we use interchangeably the terms state-owned firms, state-owned enterprises (commonly used in
the transition economies literature) and public firms (commonly used in the public economics literature).  In
all cases we mean firms whose majority shareholder is the government.
2 It is important to note that there is a distinction between the effect of debt, on one side on shareholders’
interests and the performance of the firm and, on the other, on investment.  The theoretical predictions of 
the effects of debt on shareholders’ wealth through investment is more complex.  Although it is clear that
more debt leads to higher interest payments, lower available cash flow and therefore a decrease in
investment, whether this is beneficial to shareholders depends on whether the investment undertaken is
profitable or wasteful (see Stultz, 1990). This distinction is empirically difficult to make.   We leave the
relationship of debt and investment in state firms for future research.  See also Section III.
3 Kaplan and Zingales (1995) have criticised the interpretation of the results by Fazzari et al. (1988) and cast
doubt on their methodology. For a different view, see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) who provide 
supporting evidence in favour of the predictive power of cash flow.
4 See Bertero (1997).
5 For example, for Italian firms, the state-owned holding companies’ investment proposals presented to the
government used to include details on incremental employment created in designated crisis areas (Kumar,
1993).
6 However, the threat of bankruptcy for private firms might be weaker than commonly assumed and, on the
other hand, equivalent mechanisms for public firms are sometimes overlooked.  In many countries,
although the threat of bankruptcy might have some discipline effect on the management, in practice, large
private firms rarely are “allowed” to go bust.  This is particularly true in Italy, where some Italian private
firms have become state-owned exactly to prevent their bankruptcy as private firms.  On the other hand,
public firms do incur restructuring and closing downs and, more recently, often operate under the threat of
privatization. Laffont and Tirole (1993) make a similar point.
7 Recently, Maskin (1996)) and Li (1996)  attempt to provide a formal theoretical framework to Kornai’s
concepts; Faure-Grimaud (1996) models the effects of the soft budget constraint for regulated firms.  For
related issues see also Dewatripont and Tirole (1995).
8 It is unclear whether this outcome is due to the hopelessness of putting firms in the hands of bureaucrats
or to the incompleteness of contracts between managers and the state and also between the state and the 
taxpayer, in a similar fashion to private firms.
9 See Kumar (1993) for a good survey on the evolution and organisation  of  Italian state holding
companies.
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10 For example, with the Law n. 634/57 of 1957 state holdings were required to locate a fixed amount (40
percent of the stock or  60 percent of any increment) of fixed capital investment in Southern Italy,
independently of expected profitability.  Although this rule was never fully implemented, it shows that
regional development was a priority for state intervention.   
11 By tradition, IRI and ENI, the two major state holding used to be “controlled” by Christian Democrats
and Socialists, respectively. Although employment contracts are under the private law and pay-
performance incentives are applied, this did not prevent a vicious circle of political patronage (see Kumar,
1993 and Brunello, Graziano and Parigi, 1996 on executive compensations in Italy).
12The so-called oneri impliciti, implicit costs.  
13 In this and other respects Italian medium and long term credit banks are similar to French specialised
financial institutions. See Bertero (1995).
14 The Italian government was allowed a longer adjustment period to implement the First Banking Directive
because of the technical and structural problems of its banking system.
15 However, it was soon blocked.  The privatisation of Alfa Romeo (automobile industry) in 1986, was
followed by the sale of Lanerossi (textile industry) in 1987, but the sales of SME (food industry) and
Maccarese (agriculture) were blocked in 1985.  The coalition government in power at that time feared that
privatizations would dent their control and political patronage in public enterprises (see Kumar, 1993 and
CER/IRS, 1993).
16 Our own calculations from data in other sources show that after reaching a peak of 1.08 percent of GDP
in 1983, endowment funds to state-owned firms shrank to 0.46 percent of GDP in 1985 and then collapsed
to 0.09 percent of GDP in 1987.  For completeness, we also report that in 1991 and 1992 endowment funds
were raised again and reached about 0.13 percent of GDP, still well below previous peaks (CER/IRS 1993).
17 Investment is also important, but beyond the scope of this paper. Besides the theoretical considerations
in note 2, assessing the impact of financial pressure on investment for public firms is an exercise even more
complex than for private firms.  Investment decisions for public firms are based not only on the standard
criteria of positive net present value, as for private firms, but also on other issues, such as the promotion
of economic growth, regional development and the softening of the impact of the business cycle.
18 Our estimation strategy follows Nickell and Nicolitsas (1995)’s one, although theirs was applied in a
study with a different motivation, overall framework and institutional background.  From a macroeconomic
perspective, they test whether a rise in interest rates (i.e., in the cost of borrowing and in financial
pressure) leads managers to take actions to raise efficiency, reduce wages, cut back on hiring for a panel of
UK large, manufacturing, private firms. In particular, we do not include a wage equation in our analysis
because in the highly regulated and rather inflexible Italian labour market it would be a rather dull exercise. 
19 Employment figures include workers in temporary lay-off (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni).
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20 For import penetration we use three-digit NACE industry data averaged over the period 1977-1991. For
industry concentration, the only available data is the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) for 1987 at the
three digit level of the NACE classfication.
21 In equation (1) these variables are multiplied by t to ensure that they enter in levels in the estimating
equation after first differencing.  This approach draws from the approach that Nickell (1996) uses for the
study of  the impact of competition on corporate productivity of UK private firms.
22 In this paper we do not address the issue of the discipline of debt relative to its maturity.  In parallel to
the argument regarding our choice of a stock measure of leverage,  we think that, for public firms, the
maturity of loans might reflect the availability of loans for which interests are subsidised.   And we have
no disaggregated information on the size and maturity of subsidised debt.  However, for completeness, we
carried out a few estimations which add a maturity ratio to our basic specification.  The results show
statistically significant evidence of a disciplining effect of short term debt on employment and no
relationship between maturity and productivity.
23 More precisely, the Mediobanca aggregate data show that our dataset includes a few bonds for which
we have no disaggregated information (see Section IV).  However,  they make up, on average over the
entire period, for less than 0.95% of total debt (Mediobanca, Dati Cumulativi di 1760 Societa’ Italiane,
1995). 
24 For the estimation of a labour demand equation under non-static expectations, within the Euler
framework, see Rondi et al (1996),  investigating the impact of financial pressure on the firm’s adjustment
costs for labour on a panel of Italian private companies.
25 The database is built from the yearly directory Le Principali Societa’ Italiane.  Each annual volume includes
balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and other general information for the two previous years.  Time
series for our database are therefore obtained by merging data from consecutive volumes for the firms
appearing in each volume, using firms’ names as the main variable in merging. Firms are included in the
Mediobanca directory on the basis of a variable size measure.  Between 1977 and 1984, firms with sales
larger than ten billion Lire were included, between 1985 and 1986 with sales of at least 20 billion Lire and
between 1987 and 1993 with sales of at least 25 billion Lire.  For a complete description of the original
database see Margon et al. (1995).
26 Indeed, some productivity shocks, for example variations in the skill composition of the work-force or in
the speed of the production lines, are directly related to employment and capital intensity.
27 Due to the lagged variables, the estimation period becomes 1981-1993.
28We checked the cross correlation between LEV and AVLEV  for potential multicollinearity problems and it
turns out to be as low as 0.21 for the full sample.
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29 Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1997) find the opposite result using a specification aimed at investigating
the correlation between the maturity structure and firms’ performance.  Also, they use a shorter version of
the CERIS panel of private firms.
30 Our choice of 1987 as the structural break is discussed in detail in Section II.  However, the results do
not change when we locate the structural break in 1986 or 1988.
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